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Abstract 
This paper examines the clash of religious civilizations in Nigeria to understand the dynamics of religious 
violence. The paper posits that religious violence in Nigeria dates to the era Islam and Christianity through the 
activities of the missionaries was introduced among the various ethnic groups from the North and South Poles 
respectively. The two religions with ‘messianic’ mission of civilizing the world, transformed into competition 
for converts. In the search for converts the missionaries perpetuated violence against indigenous populations, 
their cultural and religious systems. The hitherto existing indigenous religion – the African Traditional Religion 
– cemented relationships between people, society and nature. With the arrival of ‘new religions’ – Islam and 
Christianity, in their quest to dominate led to conflicting relations among various ethnic groups that make up the 
Nigerian federation. The collision of these religions gave birth to the clash of religious civilizations, which have 
become unprecedented in contemporary time. The nature of religious violence in Nigeria is tied to elite 
manipulation of religious adherents to advance their own interests in the political arena. The paper concludes that 
putting religious differences to culture is central to curbing religious violence in Nigeria. 
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1. Introduction 
Imported Destroyers: before our imported truths, Africa had her truths, our 
shrines and Priests; war was not recorded between one truth and another. 
  - Kefas Bako, The Imported Destroyers, (2013).  
Nigeria with over 140 million people (National Population Commission, 2006), is no doubt one of the 
most populated countries in Africa, and indeed, one of the most religious in the world (Lenshie & Abel, 2012). 
As a matter of fact, religion in Nigeria occupies the prime of the socio-economic and political life of the country, 
that is, the process of policy making and implementation of the government in Nigeria is guided by religion 
among other factors. The process is usually informed by the religious heterogeneity of the country, which if not 
taken into consideration usually leads to conflict, and consequently, violence. Despite religious heterogeneity, 
dominant religion in Nigeria include Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religion. Religion is a force 
which has packaged the thought pattern of most Nigerians not to think outside what they believe in, and anything 
that appears to contradict their belief systems, they tend to oppose it vehemently, which consequently has been a 
major source of conflict among various religious adherents, especially Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. The 
contradictions arising from the contraption of these religions explains the dynamics associated with power 
struggles and power relations in contemporary Nigeria.   
However, the ascendency of religious identities in Nigeria is rooted in the historical evolution of the 
country, particularly the manner in which these religions penetrated Nigeria and the role played by the colonialist 
to nurture the elites and exacerbate ethnic and religious consciousness and intolerance among the people of 
Nigeria (Akinwumi, 2005).  
Since independence, religious as an instrument of political manipulation of the masses for the pursuit 
of state based resources continued, and gradually but also steadily surmounted the desire and effort to ensure 
peaceful co-existence and national transformation in Nigeria (Adebanwi, 2004; Smah, 2008; Østby 2008). 
Despite the philosophy of peace claimed by the various religions appears to appeal to the need for unity and 
harmony internally among various sects of the religion. Inter-religious relations, in most circumstances, has been 
marred by acute level of religious hatred, intolerance and violence since the end of the cold-war. Since the 1990s, 
Nigeria became increasingly divided along religious lines, and open confrontations via most religious messages 
became fierce (Okpeh, 2008). This was not the case before Islam and Christianity entered Nigeria. Although, 
precolonial Nigeria was not without conflicting relations that turned out violently, but not on the bases of 
religion. It is in this context that this paper is set out to examine the dynamics of religious violence in 
contemporary Nigeria. 
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2. Conceptual and Theoretical Discourse  
Religion throughout the world is emotionally driven. Often, at a slightest provocation religion transforms from 
an instrument of peace-building to an instrument of violence. The attempt to understand the logic, which inform 
the violent nature of religion poses serious challenges. Scholars (Haynes, 1999; Stephen, 1999; Otite & Ogionwo, 
2006) have associated the religious violence to the manner which preachers and their adherents behave towards 
opposite religions. On the contrary, Mamdani (2002 & 2004) refuted this claim that it is rather the non-religious 
intellectuals that are responsible for violent religious motivations. Either way, it is evident that religious practices 
have been violent in contemporary times under the façade of fighting God’s battle.  
From this background, it is therefore relevant to understand what religion is all about. Otite & 
Ogionwo (2006) cited Emile Durkheim as defining religion as, “…a unified system of beliefs and practices 
related to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unites into one 
single moral community.”  Religion, according to Karl Marx, in the words of Giddens (1971:110), is ‘…the 
transmutation of representation of values which are in fact, created by man in the society, and the provision of 
principled support for an existing social and political order…’ purported to achieve class interests. Because of 
the claim to sacredness, religion is seen as an indisputable and non-interrogative phenomenon. However, the 
implication of religion in negotiating the contours of intergroup relation has been far reaching. Evidence abound 
that religion create, nurture and determine group consciousness that can be transformed easily into violence, 
depending on the circumstance that warrants it, and the magnitude of ‘we feeling’ among members.  
According to Lenshie (2010:16), often religious rhetoric or propaganda are used to galvanise sympathy 
in order to effectively garner support to assert collective conscience which may be real or given, notwithstanding 
the political undertones promoting violence. In most parts of the world, the attempts to question certain religious 
tenets have led to wanton killings of lives and destruction of properties with many people displaced. Nnoli 
(2008), while explaining the reason why religious violence occur in diverse societies, stated thus: 
Religious differences have a high potential for separating people from one another. 
Throughout history these differences have been the basis of tension, animosity and 
even war. Many times a certain fanaticism is associated with people of a different 
religion, or hampers mutual trust and confidence when such relations happen to 
exist. This is because religion tends to define what constitutes appropriate social 
behaviour. When this definition is at cross purposes with another, normal relations 
become difficult.    
This also goes to explain that, religion is dynamic and can direct peoples sense of reasoning. Stephen (1999), 
buttressed this assertion further thus:  
…religion provides definition, principles of judgment and criteria of perception. It 
offers reading of the world, of history, of justice and of ultimate truth. Religion 
limits or increases the conceptual tools available, or channels them, and withdraws 
certain issues from inquiry. It inculcates a particular way of perceiving, expressing 
and responding to reality. Religion can legitimize new aspirations, new relations 
and a new social order. Every religion involves struggles to conquer, monopolize 
or transform the systematic structures which order reality.  
Because of the role religion play in negotiating group relationship, it is central to the clash of 
civilisations, which Huntington (1993), considered to be decisive to determining the nature of the global 
relations in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, religion tends to have a composite effect on 
intergroup relation. Religion tends to unite members of the same faith across the world, but it also tends to pitch 
members of different faith almost in a constant ideological confrontation, and often, violent conflicting 
relationship. Although notwithstanding, there exist internal differences in each religion, which manifest 
dramatically based on doctrinal differences. Conflicts arising within the same faith on doctrinal differences have 
been evident between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and Catholic and Protestant Christians.  
Why the inter-religious intolerance and violent relationship when there are so much that unite them 
than what divides them? More often, however, in religiously divided, complex and competitive societies, 
religious zealots and bigots have exploited religion for selfish interests (Haynes, 1999). In this task, the 
insignificant differences have been overemphasised among religious adherents as major areas of conflict.  The 
motivation of religion to violence does not occur in a vacuum, there are conditions that necessitates its 
occurrence, which can be internal, external or both, depending on the manifest reality. Internally, religious 
violence can occur when particular adherents perceive that their belief system is superior to other religions, or a 
when a sense of religious deprivation is nurtured or alternatively, a competitive equality with other religion is 
established.  
Religious violence instigated by external sources occurs when there is perceived internal weaknesses 
vis-à-vis other religions among adherents of a religion. In order to dispel competitive equality or dominance, the 
adherents turns to external support from the brotherhood across the world to assist them. The support for 
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religious operation come mainly from the non-state actors and state actors, both within and outside the country. 
They provide both ‘fiscal and physical resources’. The fiscal and physical resources come in the form of 
financial support and material support respectively. Sometimes, physical resources also include human support, 
such as the importation of martyrs, who have only their labour to offer in exchange for the life-here-after. These 
are religious expendables. The state actors may not directly and openly support the crusade. They may hide 
behind the non-state actors to offer support to brotherhood. Beside the fiscal and physical supporters, there are 
also ideological supporters. These are people who provide the rationale for such crusade. These would be 
detailed in the proceeding discourse. The activities of fiscal and ideological supporters reflect elitism.    
The analytical tool to explain the dynamics of elitism is to situate the discussion in the writings of 
Roberto Michel (1911), Vilfredo Pereto (1935), Gaetano Mosca (1939), Charles Wright Mills (1959) and 
Thomas Dye (1972). They have offered different explanations to situate the character of the elites (Verma, 1975). 
From their diverse analysis, there is exist certain commonality about who the elites are. Definitively, the elites 
are a ‘small minority group’, who by their possession of social and political power, influence the majority group 
in the society.  They are a successful group of people who have risen to the top in every occupation and stratum 
of the society (Mahajan 1988). They are prime movers, agents, symbols of the entire common life, and the 
embodiments of the values that maintain society. They belong to an exclusive class from which the rest of 
societies are short-out (Aghahowa & Atuanya, 1996:447-484).   
Ihonvbere (1999) puts it that, elites does not only control and dominate the commanding heights of the 
economy but also exercise legal monopoly over the means of coercion and dominance of the structures and 
institutions of politics and economy. They shape the ideological and philosophical direction of society. These 
they do easily because materially they are empowered through their educational exposure, connection and talent 
(Shopeju & Ojukwu, 2010). In other words, they are a privilege minority within a larger group imbued with, or 
characterised by, organisational skills, leadership abilities, knowledge and information, drive and ambition. They 
are societal agents through which broader social forces such as ethnicity, class and religion are filtered to 
ordinary people. They determine the strings of character which play out in intergroup relations across every layer 
of the society. 
In the discourse of power elites, Mills (1956) and Dye (1972) postulated that the elites occupy the ‘top 
positions’ of authority to run programmes and activities of major political, economic, legal, educational, cultural, 
scientific, and civic institutions. By virtue of their positions, they control half of the nation’s industrial, 
communications, transportation, and banking assets, and two-thirds of all insurance assets. This can also be 
applied to local communities where a small number of individual have the control of the societal wealth and as 
such influence society (Verba, 1975). Mills classified the elites into three, which are: firstly, the highest political 
leaders including the president and a handful of key cabinet members and close advisers; (political elite); 
secondly, major corporate owners and directors (economic elite); and thirdly, high-ranking military officers 
(military elite). 
In African societies, there are more to this classification. There are rather six power elites in Africa 
namely, the political elite; the economic elite; the military elite; the traditional elite; the educated elite and lastly, 
religious elite. Accordingly, they have mutually but also exclusive interests at stake, which requires collaboration 
to dominate the masses (Dunmuye, 2006). These elites individually and collectively have the capacity to create 
and determine the political atmosphere of African states, to render it peaceful or catastrophic. Though they differ, 
their interests are common. They conflict however, when their interests is across purposes, which they use to 
mobilize and crystallize the masses into social actions that often leads to violence.    
The dynamics of the clash of religious civilization in Nigeria can be understood in this context. Despite 
the classification seen above, in this study the elites are broadly classified into two: firstly, religious elites and 
secondly, non-religious elites. Beside the religious elites, every other elite group identified above (political elites, 
economic elites, military elites, traditional elites, educated elites and religious elites) constitute the non-religious 
elites. The religious elites are those group of people having the obligation of sermonizing religious ideology. 
They are responsible for preparing the adherents mentality and spiritually for the life here on earth and the life-
here-after. Because they are also part of the elite class, in their preaching they rationalize and justify the 
operation of elite groups over the masses as divine. The masses have no objectives to question the rationale of 
such message but take as divine so long it emanates from their spiritual leaders.  
The religious elites at this juncture, because of the enormous powers they wield over the mass mind, 
they can enforce some dogma that has the capacity of transforming the population of adherents into instrument 
of violence. However, at the same time giving them the hope of the life-here-after, if their resources were 
judiciously used to promote the religion. The rationalization of the mass mind find expression in the application 
of the logic of transcendental myth. This transcendental myth makes meaning only within a particular scripture 
which the adherents holds as a ‘holy books’. The religious elites keep harping on certain areas within the ‘holy 
book’ that speaks much about the unbeliever and the treatment to be mated on them if they refused to accept the 
new faith. Also, across different religions, religious elites cite areas of minor doctrinal differences and verses of 
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the scriptures that seemingly appear warlike to ignite violent feelings against other religious adherents (Mamdani, 
2002 & 2004).   
Nevertheless, the non-religious elites consist of the intellectuals and the non-intellectuals. The 
intellectuals are a particular group endowed educationally in the knowledge of religion and otherwise gained 
through research. They are outspoken and have the capacity to apply mundane myth to rationalise the mass mind 
and justify certain actions as necessary. The non-intellectuals consist of those groups that does not belong to the 
teaching profession nor do they engage in scholarship, knowledge production and distribution. They consist of 
people possessing enormous economic, political, military and traditional powers or resources at their disposal. 
They can make use of these resources or powers to create a niche for themselves within the religious group, and 
also mobilize and instigate members into social action, offering them all the required supports needed for 
undertaking such actions (Mamdani, 2002 & 2004).  
The reason behind their support hinges on the fact that they have obligations to ensure that the God’s 
own religion is expanded beyond their religious frontiers. In so doing interreligious conflicts becomes eminent. 
More often, the support which the religious and non-religious elites offer to adherents to trigger violence is 
construed by their selfishness – the quest to capture state power. As they grabble with power, they manipulate 
the people and present it as if they are struggling for a just curse to ensure that the religious group, which they 
belong are disposes of the control of power, or otherwise. To achieve the objective of capturing state power the 
feeling of insecurity is created to rally their followers, and the instrument which they use are transcendental and 
mundane myths (Harowitz, 1985). The logic of mundane myth finds expression in the social, economic and 
political material condition of adherents, whereas the transcendental myth finds expression in the use of religious 
dogma. The non-elites, merely religious zealots constitutes the foot soldiers, or at worse, the expendables. They 
are recruited to die in service of the religion which they belief strongly is the only source of eternity. The hope of 
these zealots is to make eternal life, which could be attained through strict obedience to the tenets of the religion.  
The foregoing discourse reflect the contemporary realities in Nigeria, and indeed, in other countries 
across the world. The situation contradicts the theoretical postulations of the modernization and secularization 
theorists, who predicted the decline of religion in the modern global politics (Deutsch, 1953; Apter, 1965; Smith, 
1970). Since the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States of America, religious violence across the world 
has been on the rise, affirming Huntington (1993) observation and prediction that, religion including its cultural 
composition will be major drive of contemporary global politics, despite continuous relevance of states entities 
as major actors in the international system. The evidence from across the world also point to the centrality of 
religion as a bolstering or undermining factor of state political legitimacy, because it can legitimise as well as 
undermine the state capability through consciousness building (Lewis, 1974; Haynes, 1994; Fox & Sandler, 
2003). Nigeria is no less an example where religion is a major challenge to national integration and 
transformation despite its constitutionally defined secular nature.   
 
3. Origin of the Clash of Religious Civilisations in Nigeria 
The origin of the clash of religious civilisations in Nigeria as it is throughout Africa, is rooted in the history of 
African encounter with foreign religions, particularly Islam and Christianity. Before their arrival there were 
several religious belief systems, collectively called the African Traditional Religion (ATR). It could be argued 
that Africa, and indeed Nigeria, was not unreligious before their encounter with Islam and Christianity. This 
assertion is upheld by Ekoko & Amadi (1989) thus: 
Long before the coming of Islam and Christianity, the people who occupied the 
area of the present day Nigeria was not unreligious. A typical traditional society in 
the Nigeria area evolved religious strategies which ensured the survival of the 
cornerstones of social norms, hopes, expectations and existence.  
It is plausible to state in tandem that, religious practices across Nigeria essentially traditional religion 
was not prone to conflict, both at the immediate and the larger social milieu. According to Ajayi, (1968:386-387), 
‘Religion … was the cement of goodwill and the fear that kept the family as a unit and the village as distinctive 
community’. In fact, throughout the pre-colonial times, ‘all activities and instrument of governance and survival 
were clothed in religion’ (Kalu, 1989:11). This assertion may be disputed, but evidence from the extant 
literatures have shown that, Islam was never known to the Hausa speaking people and of course, other northern 
extraction, not until the second half of the fourteenth century, when it was introduced by refugees from Mali 
(Ubah, 1985:228).  
Islam has been the practice in the Borno Empire before penetrating the Hausaland. It is equally evident 
that, in spite of the long history of Islamic religious standing among the Kanuri and the Shuwa Arabs, it has not 
defied their traditional religious practices in the present day Nigeria. The spread of Islam into other parts of the 
country was both piecemeal and forceful (Ubah, 1985; Barkindo, 1989; Mohammed, 1989; Okwori, 2003; Awu, 
2008; Ahmad, 2010). With the conquest of hitherto existing state formations, it marked the beginning of Islamic 
domination, or alternatively, colonization of these states, that were arbitrarily ‘independent and existing in varied 
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forms and sizes with different structures of political and social systems’ (Oyovbaire, 1985; Odofin, 2003). For 
them, their incorporation and gradual imposition of Islam as a state religion was externally negotiated into their 
respective societies and presented them as vassal states and communities at the periphery of the Sokoto 
Caliphate (Lenshie & Abel, 2012:43-53). 
In most parts of the northern Nigeria there was no such thing as Muslims before the arrival of the 
refugee from Mali into Hausaland, and of course, throughout northern Nigeria. In the same manner there was no 
Christianity in Nigeria. In this regard, Mazrui (2001) stated that: 
… In most parts of Africa and particularly Nigeria, there was no such thing as a 
Christian identity before the arrival of the white man and his cultural baggage. 
Christianisation was not only the sharp contrast to, say, African Muslim identity or 
traditional identity.   
This explains that Christianity is a later arrival on African soil, particularly in the Nigerian area after 
Islam had long arrived the northern Nigeria. It was introduced into the Benin and Warri areas, before spreading 
into other areas of the southern Nigeria in the 16th century (Edigba, 2012). The presence of Christianity in the 
region marked the beginning of the rejection and destruction of the traditional religious practices of the people 
which they considered as the cement of their societies (Adebisi, 1989). It must be stated that in the same manner, 
Islam was introduced in most parts of northern Nigeria. Although, Islam entered into the region as early as at the 
7th century in the Borno area, it entered the Hausaland in the 11th century. In other territories within the region, 
the people were forced to surrender peacefully or by means of warfare to accept Islam (Adebisi, 1989; Okwori, 
2003).  
Colonialism reinforced the spread of Christianity into the middle belt areas where Islam was at the 
stage of development, particularly along the Benue valley. Accordingly, in the northern Nigeria Christian 
missionaries concentrated in Shonga, Zaria, Wase, Pategi, Lokoja, Bida, Wushishi, and Kuta among other areas, 
preaching among the Muslim communities rather than the pagan areas. Their expansion into the core Islamic 
areas of the northern Nigeria, particularly the Kano emirate in the later century, attracted serious concern from 
within the northern Nigeria and in England, leading to their overt restriction by the colonialist as a measure to 
keep to their promise of protecting the region from Christinisation (Sa’ad, 1980; Adebisi, 1989; Okwori, 2003; 
Logams, 2004). 
While restricting Christian missionary activities from the core areas of northern Nigeria where Islam 
has been dominant, the colonialist allowed the missionaries to perpetuate cultural violence in the pagan areas by 
preaching and attacking the shrines and priests and incarcerating those who refused to accept Christianity. This 
ensured that two dominant religions existed, seemingly as conscious political design to maintain neo-colonial 
influence in Nigeria after their departure (Adebisi, 1989; Lenshie & Abel, 2012:48-49). These religious 
civilisations, Islam and Christianity, have come to exert more influence over and above indigenous norms and 
value systems of Nigerians. These religions came with different cultural orientations as gamut of their respective 
civilisations. Islam came with Arab cultural orientation and civilisations, as Christianity with Western cultural 
orientation and civilisations. The different orientation and civilisations have defied the existence of indigenous 
social and cultural value systems, leading to serious collision, subsumed as the ‘clash of religious civilisations’.  
The central Nigeria is the epic centre of the religious collision, with the southern and northern Nigeria 
fanning its manifestation. The arrival of these foreign religions on the Nigerian soil, first ensured the weakening 
of the indigenous religion. After a successful collapse of their reservoirs, they instituted hegemony and moved 
southward and northward respectively, to collide at the central region of Nigeria in search of converts and 
dominance, leading to ‘clash of religious civilisations’ (Lenshie & Abel, 2012). Historically, Islam and 
Christianity are considered as monotheistic, why then the conflict between and among believers of Islam and 
Christianity? This question finds explanation in Mamdani (2002:768) submission that: 
…Islam and Christianity have in common a deeply messianic orientation, a sense 
of mission to civilize the world. Each is convinced that it possesses the sole truth, 
that the world beyond is a sea of ignorance that needs to be redeemed. In the 
modern age, this kind of conviction goes beyond the religious to the secular, 
beyond the domain of doctrine to that of politics… 
From the foregoing, it is factual that each of the religion makes claim to messianic mission of 
civilizing the world and having the soul truth to achieve salvation. This is at the centre of the conflicting 
relations between them.   
The clash of religious civilisations manifest in Nigeria at two levels – the first is at the macro level and 
the second is at the micro level respectively. At the macro level, the clash of religious civilisations occur 
between two or more religion competing for space and hegemony. The early religious arrival seek to maintain 
spatial hegemony whereas the latter religious arrival seek to gain the space to penetrate, or alternatively, 
overthrow the status quo within the geographical boundaries. At the micro level, the clash occur based on 
sectarian identity between two or more sects of the same religion, contesting for internal religious hegemony. 
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The contest usually manifest on the basis of early and late arrival as well as ideological or doctrinal differences.  
As Mamdani (2004) argued in his essay: The secular roots of radical political Islam, the clash of 
religious belief systems, particularly between Islam and the others, is not a function created by the religious 
intellectuals such as the ulama and the mullahs, but by non-religious intellectuals which he identified to include 
the likes of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, who are journalists and literary critics 
respectively. It must be stated however that both religious and non-religious intellectuals over the years have 
been complimentary in inundating religious adherents into social action, provided they share and practice the 
same religion. Mamdani (2004:108) cited Sayyid Qutb as asserting that ‘you must make a distinction between 
friends and enemies because with friends you use persuasion and with enemies you use force…’ Sayyid Qutb 
statement reflect the effort by the non-religious intellectuals to generate religious consciousness among adherents, 
which the religious intellectuals in the face of globalisation and internal miscarriages of relationship within and 
across religions are concerned about. This situation fascinated Mamdani to comment thus:  
I realized in fact that many of the primary intellectuals of political Islam, 
contemporary political Islam, and perhaps contemporary political Hinduism, like 
political Zionism, are not religious intellectuals. I wondered why it was so easy for 
non-religious intellectuals to come into the religious domain and realized we were 
dealing with a religion organized differently from Christianity (Mamdani, 
2004:108). 
This wonder indicates the infallibility of the role of the elites generally, whether they are religious or 
non-religious elites, hiding under the armpits of religious identities to stir up religious consciousness and 
violence to complicate intergroup relationship in Nigeria. This manifest through religious manipulation, which is 
not recent but historical as already pointed out in the preceding arguments that it started earlier during the 
formative periods of the Nigerian state. The implication for the manifestation of religious manipulation in 
Nigeria has been fossilized by the media through reportage. In this context, media social responsibility has been 
crystallised and sacrificed on the altar of sectional interests that tends to mystify the general public on issues of 
national interests.    
There is no gainsaying therefore that religion is capable of being manipulated, because people always 
feel attached more to it than to their respective utilitarian activities. This explains that religious manipulation and 
restiveness is not a function construe by mass poverty, corruption and democratic deficits, as some studies on the 
Boko Haram sect revealed that these problems are central to their insurgent characteristics. Social realities in 
Nigeria from the historical times have shown that both the poor and rich are highly attached to religion. 
Durkheim cited in Giddens (1971:10) understood the efficacy of religion, when he stated: 
Men feel overpowered by a force greater than themselves, which results from the 
collective effervesce of the occasion. The individual is conveyed into a world 
which appear to him to be utterly different to that of the everyday utilitarian 
activity to which the bulk of his life is devoted. 
Because the religious feelings and attachment people have to religion, particularly in Nigeria where it 
religion is seen as a natural phenomenon or as a way of life, the elites only further enhances it to their advantages. 
Beside the support religious adherents receive from the non-governing elites, the Nigerian government seriously 
support and sponsor religious activities, such as performing Hajj and pilgrimage. This is one basic reason where 
some people have come to feel that Nigeria ought to be a religious state and their religion supposed to be the 
state religion. This notion is usually framed and filtered by the religious intellectuals to their adherents without 
any synchronisation to consider the effect it will have on national unity and integration. The non-religious 
intellectuals who have bought such perception of establishing a theocratic state tailored towards Islam have 
sponsored and even registered the membership of the country in the supra-religious organisation – the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).         
It is in this connection that it suffices to state that religious intellectuals have always exploited the 
opportunities provided by the non-religious intellectuals to create division in Nigeria. This situation is glaringly 
evident in Nigeria, where religious leaders justify violence, although, most of the time tactically through their 
preaching to adherents. Even though clash of religious civilisations occur at both macro and micro level, the 
clash appears to be more violent at the macro level. The civilizational differences and orientation provide the 
spin-ball for the religious violence, notwithstanding a lot of similarities between Islam and Christianity.  
Mazrui (2003) has argued that Islam and Christianity have disrupted African ancient relationship with 
nature, by creating a ‘triple heritage’ that have placed Africa in dilemma of civilisations. He stated thus:  
What both types of African society have shared is nearness to nature. For centuries 
the continent has had abundant animal life and vegetation, and the indigenous 
religions have fused God, man and nature. Islam and Western Christianity have 
challenged this fusion. Man alone is supposed to have been created in the image of 
God – contrary to indigenous African beliefs in which the image of God takes 
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many forms. Among God's creatures, only man – according to Islam and Western 
Christianity – is close to sacredness, in possession of a soul, and destined for 
spiritual immortality. This is contrary to indigenous African religions, which allow 
other creatures to share in sacredness and sometimes endow mountains and springs 
with a holiness of their own. The arrival of Islam and especially of Westernism 
disrupted the African's ancient relationship with nature. 
This is one of the major sources of problems associated with the clash of religious civilisations, which 
characterises interfaith or ethno-religious relations in post-colonial Nigeria, and is caused by people, who have 
no adequate knowledge about the two dominant religions. 
 
4. The Dynamics of Clash of Religious Civilisations in Post-Colonial Nigeria 
In the post-colonial era, Nigerian elites who emerged from the rubbles of colonisation fed on the far reaching 
effects of colonial legacies to perpetuate themselves in power (Falola, 1998). Although these divides were 
inherently colonial creation of both Arabic and Western type. The post-colonial elites, both civil and military 
regimes have over the years used of religion among others to accentuate onto the leadership rostrum. The 
problem reflect Mazrui (2003) discourse on the ‘triple heritage’, which are juxtaposition or interjection of 
African, Islamic and Western cultures, competing for domination and the attention of ‘potential African buyers’. 
They have provided a variegated backdrop for policies, group actions, and individual decisions, such that 
different parts of the country have reacted differently to the ‘triple heritage’ phenomenon.   
In Nigeria, the imported religions have alienated man from self, people and nature, and have put a 
dagger to what in the past held the people together and now things have fallen apart. Nevertheless, remarkable 
the people in the south-west Nigeria, particularly the Yoruba have had minimal conflicts associated with religion, 
because they have put their differences to culture (Kukah, 1993). In the south-east Nigeria, religious violence has 
also been minimal, this is perhaps because virtually all the people in the region professes Christianity. Despite 
the sectarian divide between Catholic and the Anglican which have majority of followers, has not led to violence 
as politics have over the years divided them. However, the northern Nigeria, has a history of religious violence 
dated to the 18th century jihad. This has continued because of the significant population of other religious 
adherents in the region.  
The Northern Nigeria present a society where, particularly among the Muslims, everything including 
governance and education makes meaning only in the context of Islamic religion. Any contradiction constitute a 
serious challenge to Islam and its adherents. This is at the core of the rise of fundamentalism among Islamic 
zealots, who have risen to counter any form of challenges to Islamic dominance in the northern Nigeria. Within 
this premise can the movement of Boko Haram sect, whose aim is to roll-back Westernisation and its structures, 
including Christianity in northern Nigeria, and if possible to overrun the Nigerian state to establish Islamic state 
in order formation be understood. While this may remains the utmost desire of many Islamists, Islam is also 
faced with series of sectarian conflicts, such as Shiite and Sunni divides, in the face of global challenges.  
Also, equally important to state is that in contemporary times, unlike where ethnic identity being 
decisive in determining intergroup relations among the Yoruba and perhaps, the Igbo and other ethnic groups of 
the southern Nigeria. In the northern Nigeria, ethnicity does not make any serious meaning, what is very central 
is religion. Religion for many people in the northern Nigeria is a totality of life. Their attitude and disposition are 
guided by religion rather than reason. This is why Marx became cynical about religion when he argued that 
religion create false consciousness. It is a product of man’s creation, the product of those in power, who control 
social means of, and determines social relations of production supported by the elites to justify the oppression of 
the oppressed creature (Jeckreece & Nsirim, 2009). Above all, ‘religion is an opium of the masses’ (Lenshie & 
Abel, 2012:45). The reason is that religion eludes pure reason and motivate passion, and tends to object any form 
of inquiry into it as a challenge to the existence of the sacred being. This is where people become bundled up 
with religious dogma that are transcendental myths to direct and channel violent prone attitude. It is therefore 
alluding that ‘all religion are men’s creation and all men are victims of their own creation’.  
The rising religious consciousness and activities in the northern Nigeria present indicate that religious 
clashes between the adherents of Islam and Christianity have become a bazaar. The dominance of Islam in most 
parts of the northern Nigeria has been a source of concern for the majority of Christians. The Muslims have the 
notion that Islam preceded Christianity in northern Nigeria, therefore the presence of Christianity is contending 
its hegemony which transcends all aspect of social, political and economic sectors of the society. Christians have 
also expressed phobia against Islam (Kukah, 1993). The phobia for Islam in contemporary Nigeria among 
Christians is informed by the intolerant and violent nature some sect have taken to expand the religion.   
As a way of justifying the intolerance associated with Islam across the world in contemporary time, 
Halliday (1994) posits that the manifestations is ‘… a response to the perceived weakness and subjugation of the 
Islamic world…’ motivated by what Mamdani (2004) refers to as ‘political Christianity, political Hinduism and 
political Judaism’. From these assertions, it would be deduced that the Muslims in northern Nigeria perceive 
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Christianity as a rival religion, which is contesting the hegemony of Islam. This perception has given rise to 
inter-religious conflict that have been very violent. The violent nature of religion in Nigeria is rooted in the post-
colonial elite’s ideological manipulations of religious tenets for power and primitive accumulation of resources.  
This was the situation in the first republic. The religious inclined nature of the Nigerian politics was to 
be seen in the manner the regions related with one another and beyond the shores of Nigeria. In southern Nigeria, 
particularly the Eastern Region, by descent are Igbo and Christians dominated, had bilateral relations with Israel, 
and whereas the Hausa-Fulani Muslims dominated northern Nigeria had bilateral relation with the Saudi Arabia. 
In each of these regions, religious inscriptions were found written against banks, education institutions, 
workplaces and so on. In some cases, they were written in Arabic or Latin, making it difficult to be understood 
by those who are outside these religions. For example, many people have attended and graduated from the 
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, without knowing what the Arabic inscriptions on the logo of the university 
stands for. In orthodox churches citations are made in Latin which many followers know little or nothing about 
what meaning they convey.  
In southern Nigeria, particularly in the Eastern region, while it was difficult to find Hausa-Fulani 
Muslims in the public service of the region, in northern Nigeria, the Igbo and Yoruba people were virtually in all 
the sectors. In other to close the gap or the imbalance in education, economy and the public service, the northern 
region instituted the ‘northernization’ policy, although spurred by the attempt to ‘Nigerianize’ every sector, the 
northern region led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, also deemed it to implement same for the region (Albert, 1998:57). 
The policy was geared towards granting the northerners the stage to emerge unto the upper rungs of the public 
service. Albert (1998) described the policy as saying ‘enough is enough: everybody unto its mother’s breast’.  
Following the implementation, Albert (1998:57) cited Dudley (1968:219-220) to avers that ‘by 1958, 
there were five northerners in the top echelon of the service, sixty-nine in the administrative and professional 
cadre, and 237 in the executive and higher technical cadre’. Although this policy created a psychological effect 
‘…that nothing is good for the north which is not northern’ (Albert, 1998:57), internally it also created social 
disparity such that the majority of those appointed were Hausa-Fulani Muslims. This policy was also extended 
into the economic domain to empower the Hausa-Fulani Muslims by displacing the southerner, particularly the 
Igbo Christian majority as well as the northern minorities controlling the informal sector of the economy (Albert, 
1998:57). Okwori (2003) called this tactic ‘economic jihad’. This is even more evident in contemporary times, 
where government resources are used to empower adherents of a particular religion against the common good. 
The feeling that assumed the political landscape of northern Nigeria became ‘nothing was good for the 
north which is not Muslim dominated’. Many decades later, this situation has continued to be critical and 
decisive for religious consciousness in the northern Nigerian public service as well as the political terrain. It is 
reasonable to point out that, most state policies during the first republic were regionally construed by ethno-
religious sentiments. Inter-regional relations at the national level were motivated by elite’s economic interest as 
did British colonialist, but religion was very central for achieving the interest. The several riots in Kano and 
Kaduna led to the wanton destruction of lives properties. Being Christians, the Igbo people and several other 
Christian natives suffered the scourge of religious violence. This, therefore, explain some of the reasons why the 
military severally intervened in Nigerian politics (Ademoyega, 1981; Dudley, 1982; Kurfi, 1985). Several of the 
military coups were interpreted along religious lines. This problem further compounded and rendered useless the 
effort of state and nation building in Nigeria. The various military regimes crystallised the Nigerian population 
into developing religious consciousness while making effort to sustain their hold onto power.   
While emasculating religious contestations in the country, various military regimes tinkered with the 
federal structure, especially the secularity of the Nigerian state. Notwithstanding the existence of the religious 
cold war between adherents of Islam and Christianity since independence, from 1973 onward religious bigotry 
continued to dominate intergroup relations. For example, the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 
(NSCIA) demanded the inclusion of Islamic law into the Nigerian Constitution, and to establish institutions of 
Islamic legal system. This demand received peak attention when General Ibrahim Babangida came to power in a 
counter coup in 1985. To secure a niche for himself among the northern aristocrats, against the secular status of 
the country went ahead to register Nigeria membership to the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
(Onapajo, 2012:47). Since then Nigeria has continued to be seen as one of the major centres of Islam in Africa.  
The contending atmosphere between Christianity and Islam became intensified. While Muslims 
celebrated Ibrahim Babangida as a national hero and champion of the faith, Christians saw him as a villain, an 
anti-Christ, and an antagonist of peaceful interfaith relations. However, they could not do otherwise, because 
brute force characterised the regime. Worse still was the Gen. Sani Abacha’s regime. Various religious dynamics 
played out promote Islam in Nigeria.  
The character showcasing religious differences were also witnessed in the various appointments made 
during their stay in power. Measuring the debit and credit of the various military regimes on the parlance of 
inter-religious representation, it is critical that all failed to unite the country. They rather have crystallised 
Nigerian population along religious polarisation, creating horizontal inequalities and generating violent civil 
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conflicts (Østby, 2008). From the 1980s religious violence intensified, especially with the wave of Christian-
Pentecostalism into the core areas of Northern Nigeria (Kukah, 1993; Elaigwu, 2005). According to Raji (n.d):  
…Christian religious fundamentalism, which emerged as Pentecostal Christianity 
in the 80s, peaked in the 90s and began to find anchor in the social and political 
consciousness of adherents of that version of Christianity who were mostly youths. 
Pentecostal Christianity targeted mainly youths as instrument for the socio-
economic and political reconstruction. It was therefore not a surprise that the 
church became very vocal in the political process in the 90s.  
The Christian religious revivalism in most parts of northern Nigeria was considered to be unfriendly to 
Islamic dominance in the region. This led to several waves of religious violence against Christians. 
Notwithstanding, Muslims also suffered reprisals in Christian dominated areas. It suffices to note that it was 
during this period, that the northern Nigeria witnessed the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in 1982, and in Gombe 
and Yola in 1984 (Isichei, 1987; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). In March 1987 and May 
1988, there was also religious violence in Kafanchan, Kaduna State over the Sharia question. This was followed 
by religious riot at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, between Christian and Muslim students. In the 1990s 
there were series of ethno-religious riots across the northern Nigeria (Ibrahim, 1987; Maier, 2000; Elaigwu, 2005; 
Danjibo, 2011; Onapajo, 2012; Adamolekun, 2012). Since then religious violence has increased beyond measure 
(Ibrahim, 1991; Danjibo, 2011).  
These religious conflicts did not occur in a vacuum. There were motivations, which were essentially 
though political, it became religious. Raji (n.d) in this connection pointed that:  
Islam and Christianity, while not only proselytizing religions, both seek to expand 
their support base, hence conversion and poaching of followers of other religions 
through stereotypes, hate preaching, distortion, misrepresentation and 
misinterpretation of the various religious texts in such manners that promoted 
prejudice in both camps. The aim was either to exclude or include, usually 
demonizing either religion as “satanic”. Religiously “good” became 
misrepresented by the teachings of either religions.   
Usman (1987) forewarned against religious manipulations as an instrument to capture state power by 
all means. For him, ‘…the manipulation of religion in Nigeria today is essentially a means of creating the 
context for this fancy-dress ball, for this charade of disguises.’ His caution was timely as the danger was fast 
looming from every facet of the social, economic and political sectors of the country. Unfortunately, the 
population of the various religious adherents could not understand the context of his caution. This gullibility has 
continued to produce the vicious circle of religious violence in Nigeria.  
 
5. Challenges of the Clash of Religious Civilisations in Contemporary Nigeria  
In every society people seek freedom but more often, have seen bondage arising from different social 
forces. As a measure to manage these forces human ingenuity led to the evolution of democracy. Democracy is 
synonymous with the much desired human freedom, because it permit intergroup relations within the armpit of 
the rule of law. It is well known that the rebirth of democracy in Nigeria was as a result of the rekindled desire, 
toiling and suffering of men and women, young and old for human rights and freedom expressed and exercised 
in accordance with the democratic principles (Nnoli, 1998). With Chief Olusegun Obasanjo coming to power in 
May 29, 1999, Nigeria was thrown up into a dusty atmosphere of religious violence. Several religious eruption 
were witnessed in the central states of Plateau and Kaduna, with many civilians and non-combatant people 
becoming casualties (Best, 2007; Igwe, 2009).  
Before the end of the administration in 2006, there were over twenty-five recorded ethno-religious 
violence in Nigeria (Korieh, 2005). Of all these violence, there were remote causes. With specific reference to 
the religious dimension of ethnic conflicts between the Christian natives and the Hausa-Fulani Muslims in Jos, 
Plateau state, Danfulani (n.d) pointed among other problems that: 
The [Hausa-Fulani] community being Muslim does not tolerate marriage between 
their daughters and Christian but they do marry Christian girls. Most Jos Plateau 
Christian communities detest this lopsided mode of social interaction. This has 
given birth to what the Christians refer to as Hausa-Fulani raini ‘culture of 
belittling’ and arrogance since they look down with open contempt and lack of 
respect upon their host community, using such intemperate language and 
stereotypes as arna, infidels, Sarkin arna, the chief of infidels, kafirai (kafir) to 
describe them. They exhibit total disregard for the culture, religion and traditional 
institutions of their host communities. This is a fundamental reason that has 
birthed deep seated bitterness, with far reaching social consequences, that has 
continued to fan conflict on the Jos Plateau. 
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This same situation also obtains throughout the areas where Christians are a majority. The rise of 
religious consciousness and the prone nature of various ethnic populations to religious violence were configured 
by the ‘sharia question’ – the desire and commitment by the northern Muslim elites to institute Islamic laws 
across the northern states. With the basis that democracy is about human choices, the former Zamfara state 
governor (now, a Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria), Alhaji Ahmad Yerima, decided to implement the 
sharia law. Other 16 northern state governors later cued and adopted same for their respective states (Agbo & 
Lenshie, 2010). This situation aggravated the fears of the non-Muslims, both indigenes and residents in those 
states. The sharia law was considered hostile and impeaching on the human rights of other religious adherents, 
particularly the Christians, even though it was not meant for them. Where the sharia law was implemented in the 
northern states of the federation, their governors were held in high esteem and celebrated widely among Muslims, 
even beyond the country’s national boundaries, particularly among the Arab countries.        
Consequently, other zealots under different umbrellas cashed in on the religious consciousness as a 
platform to sermonise Islam, whereas other people, the non-Muslims agitated against such experiences, harping 
on the secular status of Nigeria. This situation created serious dichotomy along religious identities. Reminiscent 
of their experiences with the northern Nigeria, as an expression of Islamaphobia, the Igbo elites asked their 
natives to return to their country home. They threatened to take to violence if the situation was not reversed. 
President Obasanjo adopted the ‘sit-down-look’ perspective to wait for the collapse of the sharia system, 
knowing it was politically motivated (Onapajo, 2012). It was actually politically construed because its aftermath 
was violence and repression against non-Islamic population.  
The implication of the sharia question went beyond the Obasanjo era. In 2009 an Islamic sect labelled 
by the media as Boko Haram, which mean ‘Western education or orientation is a sin’, but addresses itself as 
Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awatiwal-Jihad (People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) 
emerged and became an uncommon force to reckon with. The message of jihad by the group against the secular 
nature of Nigeria has been vibrant and mystifying (Mu’azu, 2011). The sect drew membership and followership 
from across the country, and international supports and sponsorships, particularly given it wider link with the al-
Qaeda network and other related Islamic ideological driven groups across the world (Bamgbose, 2013). Based on 
their networks, the Boko Haram sect since their emergence has sought continuously to overthrow the state and 
establish Islamic state formation.  
The state and its agencies were brought under attack. Christians and their worship centres have also 
been attacked. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) have this statistics of attacked mated on Christians 
by the Boko Haram sect:  
Out of the 137 religious-motivated violent incidents we tracked, 88.3% were 
attacks on Christians, 2.9% were attacks on Muslims, attacks on security agents 
4.4%, sectarian clashes 2.2% and extra-judicial killings were 2.1%. The US 
Terrorism report 2011 indicates a total of 136 terrorist attacks in Nigeria. It is 
inconceivable therefore that Muslims were the primary victims of a jihadist group 
whose intent is to Islamize Nigeria. This year 2012 alone, there have been 49 
security incidences of which 80% have targeted Christians 
(http://news.naij.com/5117.html, 9 August, 2012). 
In fact, there is no gainsaying that the activities of the Boko Haram Islamists have been harmful to the 
collective existence of the country (Ahokegh, n.d). The recent kidnapped of over 250 secondary school girls, 
majority Christians, writing their final examinations in Chibok, Borno State, by the Boko Haram Islamists and 
several other attacks on the Christian worship centres in the northern Nigeria are self-evident. According to 
Forest (2012:2) the attacks were geared towards sparking widespread religious violence in order to destabilise 
the government. In line with this submission, Forest cited the Boko Haram’s founding leader, late Sheik Yusuf 
Mohammed stating thus: ‘Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir land. The 
current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs.’ This assertion is in contest of ‘how white European colonial 
powers drew lines on a map in a somewhat arbitrary and capricious plan to carve up the African continent, and in 
many cases empowered local tribes – frequently, many of which had embraced Christianity—to rule as proxy 
landlords until the end of WW II …’ (Forest 2012:14). 
The central message of the sect therefore is not covert, they want to terminate the Nigeria because it 
was a European creation and to establish its place an Islamic State. To actualise this objective the sect resorted to 
the use of instrument of violence against the government and its institutions and civilians. Abimbola, & Adesote 
(2012:20-22) chronicled over forty major attacks by the sect between July 26, 2009 and April 30, 2012 in the 
northern Nigeria in which many Christians and moderate Muslims were killed.  
Reacting to the insurgency in the northern Nigeria, one of the most popular militant group in southern 
Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) also threatened to ‘attack and kill all 
Muslims and bomb their Mosques in the region as a counter attack to the insurgencies of the Boko Haram 
Islamists’ in northern Nigeria (Amaize & Oyadogha, 2013). This was aggravated by fear of the uncertainty of 
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ending the religious restiveness, given the conspiracy of silence played out by northern elites over the Boko 
Haram and other related issues.  
Beyond the desire and struggle between these religions, political elitism have also played out in the 
manipulation of religion for political interests. The pattern of voting given the presidential election results 
indicated that Nigerians voted based on their religious identities. Muslims in the northern Nigeria reacted and 
took to violence contesting the election results. The reason which informed the violence was the feeling that 
northern Nigeria being Muslim dominated ought to have produced Gen. Mohammadu Buhari (rtd.), as the 
president-elect. From the map of the presidential election results indicated that Buhari won in parts of northern 
states dominated by Muslims, such as Kano, Jigawa, Niger, Yobe, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Gombe, Katsina, 
Bauchi, and Kaduna, whereas Goodluck Jonathan won in all other states of the federation except Osun state 
dominated by Christians. Angered by this results the Boko Haram Islamists cashed in on the post-election 
violence to unleash terror on citizens and non-combatant population, mostly Christians across the northern 
Nigeria. Several attempt by the sect has been made to extend its terror beyond the northern Nigeria. 
The political violence taking religious form further exacerbated religious consciousness in Nigeria. 
What is happening in most states of the federation in the contemporary times reflects Osaghae (1995) submission 
thus: 
Most actions, policies and appointments of government at every level were seen 
through the lens of religion. The lens also extended to dress, food, and the balance 
of religious propagation in educational institutions, allocation of airtime on radio 
and television, a fair balance between Muslims and Christians public holidays, and 
the religious composition of the armed forces. 
This has varied accordingly in different states, depending on the religion that is more dominant. While 
adequately the core northern and southern states have enjoyed relative stability, the central Nigeria have become 
religiously divided and violent due to the unhealthy prevalence of Islam and Christianity in the region. Because 
religion has been moved into the secular domain, the ethnic Christian natives have become more religiously 
conscious to disallow non-Christians rights and privileges in their own communities. The manifestations of the 
resistance by Christians in northern Nigeria finds expression in ‘political Christianity’, a phenomenon which 
developed lately in Nigeria after the Hausa-Fulani Muslims have established strong footings in the northern 
Nigeria area by means of ‘political Islam’.   
Raji (n.d) has argued in this connection that the effort motivated by political Christianity and its antics 
have been to redefine the political space through the ‘“salvation politics” in which access to socio-political and 
economic redemption became synonymous with “salvation”’. Though is the truism of the contemporary political 
realities, it is a response to the centuries of political Islam in northern Nigeria. Political Islam reached the zenith 
with the emergence of the philosophy of ‘never to allow non-Muslims, Kafir or Arne to rule them except they 
profess Islam. This particularly indicates that the religious attachment to state power and the control of virtually 
every means of livelihood is very central to Islam.  
In this context, the ethnic Christian population in the northern Nigeria who have considered themselves 
over the years subjugated by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, considering the religious intolerance have through 
Pentecostalism pushed for political change in the status quo. The Pentecostalism like Islamism became a source 
of protest and resistance to Islamic domination. Pentecostalism is synonymous with saying ‘to your tents oh 
Israel’, indicating that Christians were not going to tolerate social, economic and political injustices suffered 
under the northern controlled federal government.   
Most often Christians have questioned the reason why Muslim should be permitted to be governors in 
the states like Benue, Taraba and Plateau where they are dominant, when in states like Bauchi, Zamfara, Kano, 
Yobe, Jigawa, Kebbi, Katsina and Sokoto states, Christians cannot hold any meaning position no matter how 
hard they agitate for inclusion. Boko Haram insurgency, for many Christians is an Islamic agenda to reclaim 
Usman Danfodio’s territorial area by whatever means. This relentlessness can be referred to as ‘political jihad’. 
The political jihad is geared towards ensuring that Muslims control the top hierarchies of every sector in the 
country. 
It suffices to state that Islam and Christianity and those that drive them, have lent themselves as 
instruments of political manipulation. As agents of these mega religions, they have manipulated their adherents 
for political gains by transforming them into religious expendables, a xenophobic phenomenon that can be 
regarded as ‘mental colonialism’ in Nigeria. The role of the colonialist in creating this situation in Nigeria cannot 
be undermined. Since British colonial policies were geared towards economic interest, the effort to encourage 
harmonious intergroup relations was not given any attention. They rather tactically encouraged and sustained the 
north-south divides. According to Malachy (2013) ‘the predominance of Muslims in the north and Christians in 
the south orchestrated the unending north-south struggles that have come to define public policies, development 
programmes, the rules of political process and regime change in Nigeria’. This situation is also evident within 
the north itself, between the core north dominated by Muslims and the central belt, dominated by Christian 
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natives. This is at the core of the violent clashes of religious civilisations in Nigeria.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The interplay of religious identity and its transformation to violence prove clearly that Nigeria is a very complex 
country. Religion in Nigeria has brought into contest the unity and conflict of opposite motivated by the clash of 
religious civilisations – Islam and Christianity – in a domain, which was hitherto dominated by adherents of 
African Traditional Religion. The traditional belief systems were the truth that cemented the people and the 
society and nature. Of all the numerous traditional religious practices Nigeria had, there were no wars recorded 
between one truth and another. The penetration of Islam and Christianity in mutual contest for converts, 
conjugated and crystallised the Nigerian population with their orientations into becoming religious warriors 
divided along these two dominant religions, leading to what Mazrui (2001) called the ‘triple heritage’. The way 
religion has been used to manipulate adherents of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria indicates that the country is 
in great dilemma of religious civilisations. The country has not been able to manage the contraption of these 
religious civilisations, which ‘much unite them than what separate them’ into profiting the development of the 
country, but the profit of the local elites and their international collaborators, while recruiting religious foot 
soldiers to fight and die for religion by promising them the life-here-after. It is clear that religious is truly an 
‘opium of the masses’. Nigerians must loose ties of these religions to resort to the African truths and 
consociation, which defines the African brotherhood as a philosophy while practicing Islam or Christianity as the 
case may be, because the moral values of the African brotherhood is universal to both Islam and Christianity 
which claim commonplace mission of civilisations, have become one of the major contending social forces in the 
contemporary Nigeria.   
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